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The Ombudsman on a Global Conquest
The first modern ombudsman’s office was established in Sweden in 1809.
Its task was to protect the rights of citizens against the executive branch.
Since the 1960s, the ombudsman concept seems to have traveled around
the world. Ombudsman institutions currently exist on at least one govern-
ment level in most countries in the world. For citizens, ombudsmen are an
alternative to expensive and complicated judicial procedures. Individual
problems are often solved in a quick and flexible way.This is the individual
role of ombudsmen.
Based on their experience with citizens’ complaints, ombudsmen give
recommendations that seek to alter laws, regulations, and/or organizational
structures. This is the collective dimension of the ombudsman function.The
ombudsman does not have the power to make binding decisions but does
have the right to reveal problems within organizations and persuade those
organizations to follow his or her recommendations (Reif 1999).
The role of the public sector ombudsman has evolved in different ways
in different countries. Roy Gregory (2002) distinguishes between two main
types of public sector ombudsmen, depending on the country they func-
tion in. The pioneers of ombudsmanship (Sweden, Finland, Norway,
Denmark, and New Zealand) are all high-income, stable democracies with
rule of law.The objective of these ombudsman services has been to provide
a fast, effective, and user-friendly way of protecting citizens against malad-
ministration, which has been deemed necessary because of the increasing
impact of governments on citizens’ lives. The ombudsman was thus seen as
an antidote to “big government.” Ombudsman institutions had similar
origins in former colonial states that inherited democratic institutions, such
as Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica.
But as“ombudsmania”has grown,not surprisingly,so has its diversity (de
Asper y Valdes 1999: 227). In the second half of the twentieth century, the
institution rapidly spread around the globe.After the democratic revolutions
in Spain and Portugal, a new wave of democratization dramatically lowered
the number of authoritarian regimes. Structural democratic change (parlia-
ment,elections,etc.) occurred quickly,but citizens and public officials often
were unaware of the basics of the rule of law, governmental integrity, and
human rights;this need prompted an expansion of the role of ombudsmen in
these new democracies. As Gregory puts it: “Underlying the widespread
popularity of the institution, it seems, is the perception that the ombudsman
concept is an idea whose time has come, and indeed come twice, with the
second wave of Ombudsman Offices satisfying the need not so much for
accountable administration in an age of ‘big government,’ its primary
function in the West, but providing rather a valued weapon in the struggle
against the recurrence of ‘bad governance’ in states ‘en route’ to liberal
democracy from a totalitarian or authoritarian past” (Gregory 2002: 13).
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The job titles assigned to those performing the ombudsman function
illustrate this new role. In Spain, the constitution foresees a “Defensor del
Pueblo,” a defender of the people. In Ukraine, there is a “Commissioner for
Human Rights.” In Bulgaria, the annual report of the ombudsman must
contain information on the respect of human rights. In Bosnia–Herzegovina
and Albania, there is a “Human Rights Ombudsman.” However, most “new”
ombudsmen also deal with everyday cases of maladministration, while
some classical ombudsmen deal with “hard” human rights as well. It is
therefore difficult to draw a sharp distinction between different sorts of
ombudsmen.
In recent years, there has been a shift of private sector management
techniques to the public sector (e.g., accrual accounting and performance
management). The ombudsman concept, however, has been transferred
from the public sector to organizations in the private and nonprofit sector,
such as universities, the media, corporations, and hospitals.
With so many variations of ombudsman, it is not surprising that some
academics wonder whether the concept has become “diluted” (Stieber
2000). Some public sector ombudsmen have tried to stop other organiza-
tions from using the term. In New Zealand, for example, there is a restric-
tion on the use of the word itself.Only the chief parliamentary ombudsman
is allowed to grant permission to use the title. The main concern is that the
organizational ombudsman cannot give the same guarantees about inde-
pendence and impartiality to those with complaints that the parliamentary
ombudsmen can.
The debate about what it takes to be a“real”ombudsman is beyond the
scope of this article and may never be entirely settled. Even within the field
of public sector ombudsmen, there is considerable variation. Historically,
the public sector ombudsman investigates citizens’ complaints about virtu-
ally every part of public administration. But over time, some countries have
introduced ombudsmen who are responsible for specific topics (e.g.,
gender equality, children) or specific parts of the public sector (e.g., trans-
port, pensions).
In this article, we focus on the case of Belgian ombudsmen in the
public sector at various levels of government. Belgium should be seen as a
high-income, established democracy in Western Europe, which means
that ombudsmen in Belgium would fall into the category of “classical”
ombudsmen.1
The existing literature on ombudsmen is mainly descriptive or theo-
retical, and some commonly held assumptions have not been tested. Our
goal here is to empirically investigate the ombudsman’s impact on the
relationship between citizens and government. Based on three surveys, we
analyze whether the ombudsman is able to restore trust in government,
which was one of the most important reasons (in Belgium and elsewhere)
for introducing ombudsmen. We also examine the “social profile” of
Negotiation Journal July 2008 289
ombudsman complainants. In the reports made by ombudsmen, there is
often an implicit assumption that these documents represent “what goes
wrong within public administration.” But this is not necessarily true,
because it may be possible that only a specific sector of the population files
a complaint, while others — for various reasons — do not, which means
that the complaints heard by ombudsmen may not be as representative as
has been assumed. Therefore, in our research, we compare the profile of
ombudsman complainants to that of average citizens to see how represen-
tative of the general population they are.
The Public Sector Ombudsman in Belgium
Belgium has had a national ombudsman law only since 1995,although there
had been legislative proposals to establish one dating back to the 1960s
(Anciaux 1990). In early 1997, the first Belgian ombudsman took office. (In
Belgium, there are two ombudsmen at the national level: one serving those
who speak Dutch, and one serving those who speak French.) To fully
understand the establishment of the ombudsman office in Belgium, one
must have knowledge of the (perceived) crisis in the relationship between
citizens and government that arose in Belgium in the 1990s. The assassina-
tion of André Cools, the country’s leading socialist politician, in 1991
initiated a series of events that seriously damaged the reputation of the
entire Belgian political–administrative system. The election of November
24, 1991 was a second moment of crisis. This election constituted the
breakthrough of the extreme right “Vlaams Blok” (“Flemish Block”) party.
Politicians, journalists, and political scientists were surprised by the number
of votes obtained by this party and its rise in the 1990s. Another event was
the Agusta scandal that erupted in 1993. Several leading members of the
Socialist party were found guilty of corruption in a bribery scandal that led
to the resignation of Willy Claes as secretary-general of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. The final event that shocked the nation was a pedo-
philia crisis in 1996. In August 1996, Marc Dutroux and his companions
were arrested for abducting, raping, and killing several young girls. The
subsequent public anger transformed gradually. At first, anger was mainly
aimed at Dutroux himself, but later, the government authorities were tar-
geted as well. The perceived malfunctioning of the judicial system resulted
in a “White March” attended by three-hundred-thousand citizens.
By 1997 and 1999, Belgium had become the country with the lowest
trust in government in the Eurobarometer surveys (covering all European
Union member states). But the crises brought about reforms in the public
sector. It is within this framework that the Belgian government has taken
measures to strengthen trust in the public sector. On the political front, a
“new political culture” had to replace old political habits. To address the
relationship between citizens and public administration, a United Kingdom-
like “citizen’s charter” was launched in 1992, with limited success (Van de
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Walle, Thijs, and Bouckaert 2005). In the year 2000, a global administrative
reform, called the “Copernicus-reform,”was launched. This effort sought to
mark a shift in the relationship between public administration and citizens.
The name of the project was symbolic — just as Nicolaus Copernicus
claimed that the earth was rotating around the sun, the goal of this reform
effort was to create a situation where public administration rotated around
the Belgian citizen and not the other way around (Thijs and Van de Walle
2005).
The ombudsman law must be seen within this framework. The per-
ceived rift between the citizens and their government made the ombuds-
man law a priority during this period. The draft law explicitly mentions the
confidence gap between citizen and government as an important reason for
the introduction of the new institution, and this remains an important
motive. In the 2003 job announcement for the new Belgian ombudsman,
the first criteria listed was “the ombudsman should contribute to bridging
the gap between citizens and government”(Chambre Des Représentants de
Belgique 2005).
The same link between the ombudsman’s role and the restoration
of trust has also been made in Africa, the United States, and the Nether-
lands (Sargant 1964; Unruh 1968). Lack of trust was one of the main
reasons cited for the introduction of ombudsmen at universities in
the United States (Stieber 2000). Donald Rowat (2004) argues that
an ombudsman at federal level in Canada would reduce a democratic
deficit.
Research Questions
Empirical research on ombudsmen is scarce. The existing literature is either
juridical or descriptive. Often, ombudsman institutions are introduced on
premises that are, at best, theoretically (and not empirically) investigated.
Only a very small percentage of organizational ombudsmen have provided
comprehensive evaluations of their own work (Cominelli 2005).
In this article, we focus on the empirical examination of the effect of
the ombudsman’s individual role.Our first research question deals with the
role of the ombudsman in strengthening trust in government, an issue that,
to our knowledge, has never been addressed in empirical research. As
outlined above, a major reason for introducing ombudsmen in different
countries was to strengthen or restore trust in institutions. Organizations
hope that by introducing an ombudsman, individual grievances will be
resolved. The result could be an apology, redress, or giving the citizen what
he or she is entitled to. Ultimately, if the organization did not perform as it
should have, the ombudsman’s intervention could lead to a change in the
organization’s behavior. The theoretical assumption is that an improvement
in the performance of a particular governmental entity (i.e., doing what the
citizen expects) could lead to higher trust in government as a whole.
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Within the literature on this topic, this is referred to as the “micro-
performance hypothesis” (Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003).
Linking performance to satisfaction and trust, however, is problematic
both theoretically and empirically. Different hypotheses are possible. For
instance, it could be that individuals make independent judgments about
government as a whole, on the one hand, and about individual agencies, on
the other. Moreover, some particular agencies seem to have a stronger
impact on citizens’ opinions of government than do others. Empirical
studies support the claim that the relationship between performance and
trust is not straightforward (Kampen, Maddens, and Vermunt 2003). In a
meta-analysis of customer surveys in the United States, Thomas Miller and
Michelle Miller (1991) found that fire services always get better grades than
road repair services. An implication of this finding is that even a fire
department that performs poorly according to objective performance mea-
sures will still receive a higher subjective rating than an effectively per-
forming highway department. Other research indicates that citizens’
opinions of the way public administration works are at least partly influ-
enced by stereotypes (Van de Walle 2004).
Based on all this,we should not expect the ombudsman’s work to have
a significant effect on complainants’ trust in government or public admin-
istration. Furthermore, given the fact that the Belgian ombudsman’s office
only receives a few thousand complaints every year, the effect of the
ombudsman on directly restoring trust within the entire population could
be expected to be limited at best.
A related second research question that we wish to address is the
social profile of complainants. In a democratic welfare state, reaching all
types of citizens is an important governmental goal. This may be even more
true for the ombudsman. One reason for introducing (classical) ombuds-
men was to respond to the increasing impact of government on citizens’
lives. Ombudsmanship offered a simpler alternative to judicial procedures
that, because of the expenses and other demands of litigation, are often
beyond the reach of most citizens, especially those from lower socio-
economic levels. If wealthier and/or more educated people are the main
consumers of the ombudsman’s services, then the institution would have
failed to achieve its objective to serve people at all socioeconomic levels.
Moreover, when reporting on problems within public administration, the
ombudsman will not be able to provide a truly representative overview
because he or she will fail to uncover problems that mainly affect poorer
and less educated citizens.
Theoretically, three conditions need to be met before someone files a
complaint with an ombudsman (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980). First, the
event must be noticed (“naming”) — an unperceived injurious experience
must be transformed into a perceived injurious experience. This is not
always obvious in relatively complex bureaucracies.Second, this experience
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must be transformed into a grievance; that is, the injured party must blame
some person or entity for causing this injurious experience (“blaming”). In
the last phase, this grievance is voiced to the organization perceived to be
responsible for the injurious experience (“claiming”). As William Felstiner
and his colleagues (1980) explain,most injurious experiences do not reach
the last phase.
Concerning the social profile of complainants, some empirical
research has already been undertaken. Available studies, however, are
usually publicized only in the language of the country concerned, not in
international academic journals, which makes it difficult to find literature
that gives a complete overview of this topic. Nan Van Zutphen (2002)
gives a thorough review of research in the United States, Germany, Spain,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Belgium.2 With one excep-
tion,3 the general profile of the user of the ombudsman’s services that
emerges from survey literature is “a man or woman in middle age with a
higher education and a reasonable income and enough bureaucratical
competences. . . . Members of other social groups also file a complaint
with the ombudsman, but are underrepresented” (Van Zutphen 2002;
translation by authors). As we previously mentioned, individuals may fail
to take advantage of an ombudsman’s services because they are unaware
that the institution even exists. The individual may name the problem
and blame a person or organization that he believes is responsible, but if
he does not know of the existence of an ombudsman, he will not reach
the claiming phase.
Research has found that more than 90 percent of Dutch people, for
example, know about the institution of the national ombudsman (Hertogh
2000). But this kind of research results is difficult to interpret because
participants in survey research often tend to give answers that are socially
desirable (in this case: say they know what ombudsmen are). Sandra Loois
and Marjan Sieben (2003) tried to take this phenomenon into account in
their study by asking the participants where they could go if they had a
complaint about the functioning of public administration: less than one in
five mentioned the Dutch National Ombudsman.
These findings are part of a larger research tradition on the “Matthew
effect.”4 The term,coined by American sociologist Robert K.Merton (1968),
refers to situations where those who possess certain qualities or posses-
sions will receive more, while less gifted individuals will receive less.
Merton used the term to refer to a particular situation in the academic
world. He found that when a well-known scientist published something
with someone who is relatively unknown, the former will almost always get
the credit, even when the unknown academic is the first author. In cases of
multiple independent simultaneous discoveries made by academics of “dis-
tinctly different rank,” celebrated scientists will receive more recognition
(Merton 1968). The theory of the Matthew effect has also been used to
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describe various other phenomena (Merton 1988). In the field of social
security for instance, it refers to the situation in which the bulk of social
benefits goes to people who do not really need them. We hypothesize a
similar Matthew effect in our research; that is, the ombudsman primarily
receives complaints from higher status (wealthier and better educated)
people.
Research Design
To answer our questions, we analyzed three surveys of ombudsman clients
in Belgium at three government levels. First, in 2004, we surveyed by mail
295 Dutch speakers who had made complaints to the Belgium ombuds-
man that had been dealt with in 2001. We did not investigate requests for
information and inadmissible complaints or those complainants who had
been referred to another ombudsman’s office because those kinds of
inquiries are not the “core business” of the Belgian ombudsman. The
response rate to our survey was 58 percent, which can be considered
reasonable.
The second and third surveys that we analyzed were conducted by
Kaat Van den Audenaerde (2003). She investigated clients of the ombuds-
man of the Flemish (regional) public administration and of the ombudsman
for the city of Mechelen.5 Data were collected by telephone. The response
rate was neither high nor low for the ombudsman of Mechelen
(46.4 percent, with one hundred fifty respondents). Some privacy issues
arose in the data collection phase with the Flemish ombudsman, so the data
collection was halted after only 181 complainants (of a sample of 726) were
surveyed.
In all the three surveys, data sampling was based on official ombuds-
man records. The sample was representative of the population of ombuds-
man clients. In all the three questionnaires, the two main topics were the
respondents’ satisfaction with the ombudsman and the social profile of
complainants.
Does the Ombudsman Increase Trust in Government?
Satisfaction with the ombudsman was measured in two ways. First, we
asked respondents whether they were satisfied with the process that the
ombudsman used to deal with their complaint. Second,we wanted to know
if they were satisfied with the result.
In all the three surveys, more than three quarters of the respondents
were satisfied with the way their complaint was dealt with by the ombuds-
man. This result is comparable to results from studies of satisfaction with
university ombudsmen (Harrison 2004) but indicates greater satisfaction
than was found in a study of complainants who used the services of a local
government ombudsman in the United Kingdom (Market and Opinion
Research International [MORI] Social Research Institute 1999). We should
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interpret these results cautiously, however, because the research method-
ologies are dissimilar in all cases except for the ombudsman of Flanders and
of Mechelen.
Satisfactionwith the result obtainedby theombudsmanwas significantly
lower, which is consistent with what the MORI research has shown in the
United Kingdom (MORI Social Research Institute 1999). This may reflect
complainants’ hopes that the ombudsman would be more favorable toward
them in judging the situation. In reality, the mere fact that an ombudsman
investigates a complaint does not mean that the complaint itself is legitimate.
Another issue is that addressing someproblems requires substantial structural
changes, such as altering existing law, for example. For some complainants
then,outcomes are uncertain.When comparing the satisfaction levels of the
complainants in the three different Belgian studies analyzedhere,we see fairly
similar results. But again, comparing these results is difficult because of
methodological differences between the three studies (Table One).
The second variable that is relevant here is the impact of the
ombudsman on trust in government or public administration. The Belgian
ombudsman study investigated trust in “public administration” (adminis-
tratie or administrative functions of government) while the other surveys
posed a question concerning complainants’ trust in “government” (over-
heid refers to both the political and administrative [public administration]
sides of government), thus including a political component in the ques-
tion. The impact of these terminological differences should not be over-
estimated for two reasons. First, it should be noted that it was the explicit
goal of policy makers to strengthen both trust in government, as well as
trust in public administration. Second, survey research has shown that
people’s trust in government and public administration is of a general
character.“A high level of trust in one institution tends to extend to other
institutions” (Christensen and Laegreid 2003). Citizens frequently do not
distinguish between different branches of government.
Table One
Satisfaction with the Way the Complaint Was Dealt with and the
Result of the Complaint
Way the Complaint
Was Dealt with
Result of
the Complaint
Satisfied Dissatisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied
Belgian ombudsman 77% 11% 50% 35%
Flemish ombudsman 75% 21% 51% 41%
Mechelen ombudsman 82% 16% 57% 38%
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If the ombudsman’s activities do indeed promote trust in government,
we would expect that people who are satisfied with the result of their
complaint would report higher trust ratings. Figure One displays the mean
trust rating for each indicated level of satisfaction.6 It suggests that the link
between satisfaction with the ombudsman and trust is “one way only.”Trust
ratings are very low for those who are very dissatisfied,but it does not seem
to make a difference whether complainants are rather dissatisfied or very
satisfied. A hypothesis could be that the ombudsman does not strengthen
complainants’ trust in public entities but that he or she can weaken it.
Another hypothesis is that dissatisfied complainants had an a priori nega-
tive attitude toward public institutions. Present research, however, will not
adequately answer that question.
Correlation analysis confirms what theoretical and empirical contri-
butions on this issue have found. There is, at best, a weak link between
satisfaction with the ombudsman and trust in government. The cor-
relation between satisfaction with the result of the ombudsman’s
intervention and trust in institutions is low in all cases, ranging
from 0.099 (Belgian ombudsman) to 0.146 (Flemish ombudsman) to
0.173 (ombudsman of Mechelen). All correlations were significant at the
0.05 level.
Figure One
The Link between Satisfaction with the Ombudsman and Trust in
Government/Public Administration
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2.00
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Very dissatisfied          Rather
dissatisfied
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Multivariate analysis for the Belgian ombudsman also supports the
weak link between satisfaction and trust.One of our two research questions
was whether the ombudsman has a direct effect on trust in government
and public administration. Our results indicate that this effect is modest at
best and should not be overestimated. As the literature on trust indicates,
there seems to be no “silver bullet” — certainly not the ombudsman —
available to governments to strengthen citizen’s trust in them.
Who Uses the Ombudsman?
We now consider the profile of those people who filed complaints with the
Belgian and Flemish ombudsmen. Although governments (and ombuds-
men) in a social welfare state try to reach out to all citizens, a review of the
existing literature allows us to hypothesize a “Matthew effect” in the profile
of complainants.
First, we investigated a number of demographic indicators such as
gender and age. Our results showed that the percentage of men who
complained was about twice as large as the percentage of women. This is
a general phenomenon that has been found in other empirical research
on complainants (Jacobs-Wessels 1995). Data for the Flemish ombudsman,
however, show that the situation might be somewhat more complex.
Quite often, when a woman had a problem with public administration, it
was her husband who eventually filed the complaint (Van den Aude-
naerde 2003). Naturally, this makes the interpretation of these results
more difficult.
Age is another variable for which we found significant differences
between those who complain to the ombudsman and the general popula-
tion. Young people were severely underrepresented, as were old people.
This was compensated by an overrepresentation of the group of forty- to
sixty-year-olds.Results did not greatly vary between the Belgian and Flemish
ombudsman and the ombudsman of Mechelen.
A third relevant variable is the level of education. Again, we compare
ombudsman complainants to the general population (reference group:
eighteen- to eighty-year-olds). A near-majority of complainants had a
bachelor’s or master’s degree. On the other hand, the number of citizens
with a lower level of education7 is severely underrepresented in both the
Belgian and Flemish ombudsman samples.8 Other research had already
found that citizens with a lower education are less often aware of the
existence of ombudsmen (Loois and Sieben 2003) (Figure Two).
Occupation was the fourth variable analyzed. There was no large over-
or underrepresentation of students, housewives, the unemployed, retirees,
or workers. But when we looked exclusively at employed complainants,we
found noteworthy differences between complainants and the larger popu-
lation. In the Belgian ombudsman survey, we found a significant under-
representation of blue collar workers.9
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The last variable that we analyzed was the complainants’ level of
interest in politics. Respondents were asked to indicate on a four-point
scale how interested they were in politics. More than 70 percent of the
Belgian ombudsman clients said they were “very” or “quite” interested
(unfortunately, there was no similar question in the Flemish ombudsman
survey). In the European Social Survey (a biennial multicountry survey),10
only about half of the citizens reported political interest. This finding is also
reflected in the use of media — complainants reported that they watch the
news and read high-quality newspapers more often than the general popu-
lation. A tentative hypothesis might be that the complainants’ greater level
of political sophistication makes them feel more comfortable using the
ombudsmen system.But it is also possible that complainants are more often
aware of the existence of ombudsmen, thus increasing their chances of
claiming.
Our data point to one clear conclusion: the average complainant is not
typical of the average Belgian in several key categories.Ombudsman clients
in Belgium have a specific profile: they are likely to be highly educated,
middle-aged, white-collared, politically interested men. Our results indicate
that Belgian ombudsmen have had less success reaching socially disadvan-
taged and politically unsophisticated people. In most countries, the ability
to fulfill the three conditions for making a complaint that we outlined
above (naming, blaming, and claiming) are not equally distributed across
Figure Two
Level of Education, Complainants, and Citizens
0
10
20
30
40
50
HighMediumLow
Citizens Belgian ombudsman Flemish ombudsman
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the population. The use of ombudsmen is therefore associated with the
Matthew effect in which more powerful members of society are able to
take better advantage of an institution designed to support people at all
levels of society.Even though ombudsmen are meant to be easily accessible,
in reality, not all social groups access the ombudsman in the same
proportion.
Conclusion
The number of ombudsman institutions has been growing at a noteworthy
rate for several decades. Outside government, ombudsman offices have
been adopted by banks, universities, corporations, and hospitals. As in
numerous other countries in the world, Belgium introduced (classical)
ombudsmen at different levels of government in the 1990s with the goal of
reaching citizens who had turned away from government and strengthen-
ing their trust.
In this study,we investigated empirically the impact of ombudsmen in
these two areas. The results are somewhat disappointing. The ombudsman
can only strengthen trust in government and public administration to a
limited extent. Because organizations often create ombudsmanship pro-
grams with the goal of restoring confidence in an organization, this research
finding has implications for all ombudsmen, both public and private. Fur-
thermore, we found the profile of complainants to be skewed: our results
indicate that people from lower social classes are less likely to use the
ombudsman’s services.
Our findings have some interesting implications. For example, the
annual reports of ombudsmen may not contain a representative picture of
the problems within public administration. At the Third International
Ombudsman Conference in 1984, the Swedish ombudsman mentioned
that in some inspections, he encountered poignant situations that begged
for improvement but about which he had received no complaints
(Jacobs-Wessels 1995). The results of our analysis of the link between
satisfaction with the ombudsman and increased trust in institutions
suggest that the ombudsman’s role in restoring confidence is limited.
Relying on the ombudsman to improve the relationship between an orga-
nization and its clients may therefore not be enough. Trust depends on
numerous conditions, and the ombudsman can only influence a few
variables.
What would improve ombudsmen’s abilities to nurture trust in insti-
tutions? In our opinion, policy makers should change how they think of
ombudsmen. As we have demonstrated, it would be unwise to see ombuds-
men in Belgium as merely an instrument for improving individual relations
between citizens and government.While we may never get a full picture of
what goes wrong within any administration, ombudsmen can be used as an
“early warning system.” In our view, ombudsmen should more consistently
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take the role of “change agents”who propose organizational improvements
from a citizen’s perspective (Wagner 2000).
A groundbreaking study in this field has been performed by Marc
Hertogh (2001). He compared the impact of administrative courts with the
impact of the ombudsman in controlling administrative action in the Neth-
erlands.While ombudsmen and administrative courts are comparable in the
sense that they investigate citizens’ complaints, their judicial power is vastly
different. Administrative courts are more coercive, whereas ombudsmen
have a more “cooperative” style. In the long run, he found, because of this
cooperative style, the policy impact of the ombudsman is much larger. In
conclusion, our results indicate that we should not exaggerate the indi-
vidual role of ombudsmen in Belgium, and policy makers should focus
more on the collective role of ombudsmen, which could, we believe, be
much greater.
As in all studies, this research has limitations. First, all of the surveys
analyzed were conducted in just one small country.Ombudsmen in Belgium
operatewithin specific cultural and legal contexts.Wemight hypothesize that
differences incontext (e.g.,thecontext inWesterncountriesversus the Indian
caste system; common law versus civil law) would result in differences in
findings. Also, although there is a Matthew effect in Belgium, this may not
necessarily be the case in all countries. Clearly, these findings should be
extrapolated to other countries with great caution.
Second, ombudsmen and politicians do have the ability to do some-
thing about the Matthew effect. For example, in Sweden,ombudsmen target
specific (disadvantaged) groups. There is an ombudsman for equal oppor-
tunities ( Jämställdhetsombudsmannen), children (Barnombudsman-
nen), people with disabilities (Handikappombudsmannen), against
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (Ombudsmannen mot
diskriminering på grund av sexuell läggning), and ethnic discrimination
(Ombudsmannen mot etnisk diskriminering). It seems likely that because
of their high visibility, these ombudsmen would attract more disadvantaged
complainants. To our knowledge, however, research comparing the effec-
tiveness of this system to the more traditional ombudsman systems does
not exist.11 Finally, traditional ombudsmen could maximize their coverage
in the (popular) media, thus attracting a more diverse range of complaints;
such actions might minimize the Matthew effect.
NOTES
1. Belgium has universal suffrage for males and females since, respectively, 1919 and 1948.
When looking at gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power standard, Belgium is
ranked seventh out of the twenty-five European Union countries by Eurostat.
2. Unfortunately, this overview is only available in Dutch.
3. In a New York City study that Van Zutphen cited, there were no differences in gender,
education, and marital status. The poor, in fact,were overrepresented. The author does not explain
the possible reasons for this exception.
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4. “Matthew effect” refers to the Gospel according to Matthew (25:29):“For unto every one
that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken
away even that which he hath.”
5. Flanders is the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. Mechelen is a city in Flanders
with around 79,000 inhabitants.
6. The trust variable referred to what issue was most relevant for each group studied, that is,
trust in Belgian public administration for the Belgian ombudsman, in the Flemish government for
the Flemish ombudsman, and in municipal government for the ombudsman of Mechelen. Trust
ratings were split in half for the Belgian ombudsman for an easier visual comparison.
7. Education systems vary from country to country. By “low education,” we refer to people
whose highest degree has been obtained at the age of fifteen. The “medium education” level refers
to people who have finished secondary school (age eighteen).
8. We do not have data for the reference group in the city of Mechelen.
9. This is based on an estimation of the names of the professions, of which the exact
scientific value is hard to evaluate. The underrepresentation, however, is quite clear.
10. For this article,we used the 2004 data (Jowell and the Central Co-ordinating Team 2005).
11. However, see Lindvall and Rothstein (2006) for criticism of the Swedish system.
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